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In Krieg v. Seybold,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit asserted that Robert Krieg—a dump truck, front end 
loader, and backhoe operator—had a “safety-sensitive” job, and that 
the City of Marion, Indiana, could therefore test his urine for evidence 
of drug use. Normally, the Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches and seizures requires a public employer to have 
a reasonable and individualized suspicion that an employee has used 
illegal drugs before that employer can require him to submit to drug 
testing. But the City of Marion claimed, and the Seventh Circuit 
agreed, that a “safety” exception to this requirement should expand to 
cover Krieg’s job in the Department of Streets and Sanitation. Thus, 
the City could test Krieg for drugs on a random basis. 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. With special thanks to Professor David S. Rudstein, Chicago-Kent 
College of Law, whose course entitled Criminal Procedure: The Investigatory 
Process provided the author with the necessary background to undertake this project. 
1 481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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The Supreme Court established this safety exception in Skinner v. 
Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n2 and National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab.3 In these cases, the Court held that certain jobs 
created significant safety concerns in circumstances where it would be 
impractical to require an employer to develop individualized 
suspicion. Thus, the jobs created “special” governmental needs, and 
these needs eliminated the presumption that a suspicionless search is 
unreasonable. 
The Seventh Circuit should have explained in detail why Krieg’s 
job as a heavy equipment operator raised sufficient safety concerns to 
fall within this exception. Next, it should have explained why the 
circumstances surrounding Krieg’s job made it impractical for the City 
to use a suspicion-based drug testing program to address these 
concerns.  
Instead, the court read Skinner and Von Raab to create a bright 
line rule that all employees whose jobs create serious safety concerns 
are excluded from the normal protections of the Fourth Amendment.  
Even if the Seventh Circuit correctly interpreted Skinner and Von 
Raab, it failed to create a principled reason why heavy equipment 
operators are safety-sensitive employees within the meaning of those 
cases. This failure jeopardizes the Fourth Amendment protection 
against suspicionless searches because labeling jobs such as Krieg’s as 
“safety-sensitive” leaves little room outside the safety exception for 
any kind of blue-collar labor. 
Part I below provides background information about the normal 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment as they apply to public 
employers. Part II explains the reasoning of the Krieg case, showing 
that the Seventh Circuit employed a bright line rule with regard to 
safety-sensitive employees. Part III argues that the Supreme Court has 
not adopted a bright line rule excepting safety-sensitive employees 
from normal Fourth Amendment protections, in the way that the Krieg 
court claims it has. Part IV explains why the Krieg court was not 
                                                 
2 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
3 489 U.S. 656 (1989).  
2
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compelled to hold that Krieg’s position was safety-sensitive and why 
its choice to do so gives the error in Krieg a far-reaching effect. 
 
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYERS DO NOT NEED A WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE 
 
The Fourth Amendment protects persons against unreasonable 
searches and seizures by government agents,4 and requires that 
warrants for searches or seizures be supported by probable cause.5 The 
Supreme Court has explained that the Fourth Amendment serves at 
least the following purposes: First, the protection against unreasonable 
searches protects citizens against intrusions on their privacy where 
those intrusions are not justified at the outset by some legitimate 
governmental interest.6 Second, the protection against unreasonable 
seizures of persons protects citizens from unjustified restraints on their 
                                                 
4 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-16 (private employers can be subject to the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment when they act with the “encouragement, 
endorsement, and participation” of a State or federal actor). In a Fourth Amendment 
analysis, it is typical to proceed by first determining whether the challenged intrusion 
was carried out by a government actor, then to determine whether it was a “search” 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and then to determine whether that 
search was reasonable under whatever framework applies to the situation at issue. 
See, e.g., id. at 613-19. 
5 The Fourth Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
6 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more sacred, 
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual 
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference 
of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting Union Pac. 
R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))). 
3
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freedom of movement.7 Third, the protection against unreasonable 
seizures protects citizens’ possessory interests in their property from 
infringement by government agents, unless such infringement is 
justified.8  
Next, the requirement of a warrant ensures that some neutral body 
(normally a magistrate) evaluates the character of the intrusion on one 
of the above interests and determines whether this intrusion is justified 
before the actual intrusion occurs.9 The neutral body will also 
determine the scope of the justified intrusion by describing the 
persons, places, and things to be affected.10 Finally, the requirement 
that a warrant be supported by probable cause sets a uniform measure 
below which an intrusion will not be justified.11 By creating a high 
threshold,12 it has the effect of weighting the balance of interests 
between citizen and government strongly in favor of the citizen. 
The Supreme Court has decided, however, that warrants are not 
always required. It has created exceptions to the requirement of a 
warrant for searches that are part of a lawful arrest, for situations in 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616 (stating that the detention of a railway 
employee awaiting a drug test may be a seizure if it “amounts to a meaningful 
interference with his freedom of movement”). 
8 See, e.g., id. at 617 n.4 (stating that the taking of a urine sample might be a 
seizure if it creates a “meaningful interference with the employee’s possessory 
interest in his bodily fluids”). 
9 Id. at 621-22. 
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (requiring that warrants “particularly describ[e] 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized”). 
11 See, e.g., Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003) (“The long-
prevailing standard of probable cause protects ‘citizens from rash and unreasonable 
interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime,’ while giving ‘fair 
leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.’” (quoting Brinegar v. 
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949))); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (“Except in 
certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it 
is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause.”) 
(citations omitted). 
12 See Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371 (defining probable cause as a “reasonable 
ground for belief of guilt” which is “particularized with respect to the person to be 
searched”) (citations omitted). 
4
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which police or other officials must act quickly to prevent physical 
harm or the destruction of evidence, and for various other 
circumstances.13 Each of these exceptions allows government agents 
to conduct searches or seizures without a warrant, but these acts still 
must be justified by probable cause.14 
In a different category are searches conducted by government 
agents who are not acting in a law enforcement capacity.15 Searches of 
this kind include, among others, residential housing inspections,16 
inventory searches of impounded vehicles,17 and searches that take 
place in public schools.18 These searches often do not require a 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (limited exception for 
searches of automobiles), abrogated on other grounds by Brecht v. Abrahamson, 
507 U.S. 619 (1993); the line of cases following Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969) (search incident to lawful arrest); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 
U.S. 294 (1967) (exigent circumstances). 
14 See, e.g., United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (describing the 
rationale of Hayden); Chambers, 399 U.S. at 48; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 754-55 (the 
arrest underlying an incident search must be supported by probable cause). There are 
exceptions to this rule that are beyond the scope of this article. For example, some 
searches, such as a limited search for weapons, are conducted without a warrant and 
can be justified by a lesser degree of individualized suspicion than probable cause. 
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In addition, sobriety and border-control 
checkpoints involve brief seizures for law enforcement purposes that are permissible 
despite their suspicionless nature. These seizures are limited in nature because they 
allow an officer to look for only one type of information, for example immigration 
documents, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), or indications 
that a driver might be intoxicated, Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 
(1990). When an officer wishes to engage in more extensive sobriety testing than 
“preliminary questioning and observation,” the Fourth Amendment may require 
“individualized suspicion.” Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450-51. In any event, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that the cases regarding checkpoints and other brief law-
enforcement stops are of a different category than the line of cases under Von Raab. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-50 (rejecting motorists’ claim that the Von Raab standard 
should apply and that the State police must therefore show a special governmental 
need that justifies departure from the general rule of individual suspicion). 
15 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. 
16 E.g., Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
17 E.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
18 E.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
5
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warrant, and may require a lesser degree of suspicion than probable 
cause19 or even no suspicion at all.20 
The Supreme Court has not placed drug testing in the workplace 
in any of the above categories.21 Instead, it has created yet another 
category that is unique to the public workplace environment. 
Therefore, a public employer is able to test its employees for drug use 
when that employer reasonably suspects that such drug use has 
occurred.22 It may not test all employees, but only those whom it 
suspects on an individual basis.23 This rule reflects a balance between 
governmental and personal interests that is unique to adult citizens 
working on behalf of their government.24 It is a balance that favors the 
employee, but the Supreme Court has further held that this balance 
may shift—creating an even scale—in certain situations. Such a 
situation arises where the capacity in which the citizen works is 
particularly safety-sensitive and the nature of the workplace makes the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 337 (“The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing 
any specific class of searches requires ‘balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails.’” (quoting Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37)); id. at 
341 (“Thus, we have in a number of cases recognized the legality of searches and 
seizures based on suspicions that, although “reasonable,” do not rise to the level of 
probable cause.”) (citations omitted). 
20 E.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 373-76 (routine inventory searches). 
21 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) 
(distinguishing from the line of cases regarding sobriety checkpoints and other brief 
law-enforcement stops); see also L. Camille Hebert, Early Fourth Amendment 
Challenges to Drug Testing, 1 EMP. PRIVACY LAW § 3:4 (June 2007) (explaining 
that prior to Skinner and Von Raab some federal circuit courts characterized 
workplace drug testing as an administrative search similar to those applicable to 
businesses that participate in closely regulated industries). 
22 See infra Part III. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968), the Supreme 
Court explains this standard of individualized suspicion in the law enforcement 
context as a reasonable conclusion, based on inferences drawn from the facts of the 
situation and from the officer’s own experience, that his safety or the safety of others 
is in danger. 
23 Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007).  
24 Compare Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) 
and Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) with T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325. 
6
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general requirement of individual suspicion impractical. In such cases, 
the Fourth Amendment may allow for random drug testing. The 
Supreme Court created this second measure of permissible employer 
conduct in the cases of Skinner and Von Raab.25 
 
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CREATES A BRIGHT LINE RULE 
 
The Seventh Circuit case of Krieg v. Seybold 26 was rooted in this 
second measure of permissible employer conduct. In that case, the 
Seventh Circuit reviewed an appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Indiana. The district court had 
granted summary judgment to the City of Marion, Indiana, in an action 
challenging the City’s random drug testing policy.27 
Robert Krieg had been an employee of the City’s Department of 
Streets and Sanitation since 1985, and was a union member.28 Under 
the collective bargaining agreement for the years 2003-2004, 
employees were subject to drug testing based upon reasonable 
suspicion, and were also subject to such testing following workplace 
accidents. The bargaining agreement incorporated a personnel 
handbook, and that handbook provided for random drug testing of all 
“safety-sensitive” employees.29  
Krieg was a “driver/laborer,” which meant that he sometimes 
operated large equipment such as a one-ton dump truck, a dump truck 
with a plow, a front end loader, and a backhoe, but he did not have a 
commercial driver’s license (CDL)30 and these vehicles were not 
commercial motor vehicles. Therefore, Krieg did not fall within the 
definition of “safety-sensitive” that was set forth in the City’s 
handbook. When the City required Krieg to submit to a drug test in 
2002 and he tested positive for marijuana, the City admitted that it 
                                                 
25 See infra Part III. 
26 481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007). 
27 Id. at 516; Krieg v. Seybold, 427 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
28 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 514. 
29 Id. at 514-15. 
30 Id. 
7
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should not have tested Krieg under its current policies.31 In 2004, 
however, the City unilaterally changed its testing policies. It redefined 
“safety-sensitive” to include “any duty related to the safe operation of 
City equipment.” The City employees refused to consent to this 
change and objected to it as one about which the City should have 
negotiated with the union.32 
Later that year, without any prior notice and without resolving the 
employees’ concerns regarding the new drug testing policy, the City 
required all employees of the Department of Streets and Sanitation to 
submit to immediate drug tests.33 Any employee who refused would be 
terminated.34 When Krieg refused to submit to the test and tried to call 
his attorney, his boss told him to leave the building because he was 
fired. He also threatened to call the police when Krieg did not leave 
right away.35 The City Board of Works later officially fired Krieg, after 
a meeting about the incident.36  
Krieg—together with the union—filed a complaint in district 
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.37 Krieg alleged violations of both the 
Fourth Amendment and his Due Process right to certain termination 
procedures. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
the City.38 The Seventh Circuit affirmed its judgment as to both 
claims, but this note will focus only on the Seventh Circuit’s analysis 
of the Fourth Amendment. 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis with the general rule that 
“drug testing must be based upon individualized suspicion.”39 It then 
looked to Von Raab for the proposition that “random drug testing is 
constitutionally permissible when it ‘serves special governmental 
                                                 
31 Id. at 515. 
32 Id. 
33 See id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 515-16. 
36 Id. at 516. 
37 See id. 
38 Id.; Krieg v. Seybold, 427 F. Supp. 2d 842 (N.D. Ind. 2006). 
39 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 (citing Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313 (1997)). 
8
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needs.’”40 “Special needs” is a shorthand for the Supreme Court’s 
assertion that in certain circumstances a search will serve an important 
enough governmental interest that it can be conducted despite the 
absence of a warrant and probable cause.41 The asserted need must be 
something more than the “normal need for law enforcement”42—
therefore government agents such as public employers and school 
officials often invoke the special needs doctrine to justify searches.43  
However, a special need is not sufficient on its own to justify a 
departure from the normal requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 
Instead, as the Krieg court properly explained, “when such a special 
need exists, courts should ‘balance the individual’s privacy 
expectations against the government’s interests to determine whether it 
is impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion in the particular context.’”44 As will be shown below, the 
Seventh Circuit did not adhere to this last requirement. Not only did 
the court fail to determine whether requiring the City of Marion to 
show “some level of individualized suspicion” would be 
“impractical,” it also failed to point to a single reason why the City 
could not have complied with that requirement.  
In short, the Seventh Circuit treated Von Raab as if it created 
bright line rule that a special need could—by itself—justify drug 
testing without suspicion.45 As will be shown in Part III, below, the 
Supreme Court has never condoned such a rule. 
 
 
                                                 
40 Id. (quoting Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 
665 (1989)). 
41 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
42 Id. 
43 See infra Part III for more on the requirements of the special needs doctrine 
and on how the Supreme Court has applied this doctrine to employers versus to 
school officials.  
44 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 (quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665). 
45 See id. (“However, the Supreme Court has held that random drug testing is 
constitutionally permissible when it ‘serves special governmental needs . . . .’” 
(quoting Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665)). 
9
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A. The Seventh Circuit’s Definition of a Special Need 
 
To determine whether a special need existed in Marion, Indiana, 
the Seventh Circuit asserted that “a special need exists when the 
government employee subjected to random drug testing holds a ‘safety 
sensitive’ position.”46 It then set forth the following test, relying on 
Skinner: “To determine whether an employee occupies a safety 
sensitive position, courts must inquire whether the employee’s duties 
were ‘fraught with such risks of injury to others that even a 
momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous 
consequences.’”47 
The court looked to several cases from other courts that had 
interpreted this definition of “safety-sensitive.” According to the Krieg 
court, lower federal courts had held that duties such as operating 
forklifts, tractors, cranes, and other types of heavy equipment satisfied 
the Skinner definition.48 The court also explained that lower courts had 
rejected claims that public employees such as mail van drivers, shuttle 
bus drivers, and passenger car drivers held safety-sensitive positions.49 
The Seventh Circuit held that because Krieg operated “large 
vehicles and equipment” and these could “present a substantial risk of 
injury to others if operated by an employee under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol,” Krieg “performed a safety sensitive job.”50 His job 
raised greater safety concerns than those of van and passenger car 
drivers because Krieg’s equipment was “larger and more difficult to 
operate.”51 Finally, the court emphasized that Krieg operated his 
equipment “in the City near other vehicles and pedestrians” rather than 
                                                 
46 Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630). 
47 Id. (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628) (bracketed material in original). 
48 Id. at 518. 
49 Id. (referring to Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 
766 (D.D.C. 1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Lyng, 706 F. Supp. 934 
(D.D.C. 1988)). 
50 Id. (Krieg “regularly operated a one-ton dump truck, a dump truck with a 
plow, a front end loader, and a backhoe”). 
51 Id. 
10
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 377
in “rural areas.”52 Thus, the court held, “any reasonable jury would 
conclude that Krieg’s job duties” were safety-sensitive within the 
meaning of Skinner.53 
  
B. The Seventh Circuit’s Balancing Test Demonstrates That It Adopted 
a Bright Line Rule 
 
Next, the Seventh Circuit balanced the “intrusion on [Krieg’s] 
Fourth Amendment interests” against the extent to which the City’s 
drug testing program would promote a “legitimate governmental 
interest.”54 It considered these factors: 
 
1) the nature of the privacy interest upon which the 
search intrudes, 2) the character of the intrusion on the 
individuals’ privacy interest, 3) the nature and 
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue, and 4) 
the efficacy of the particular means used to address the 
problem.55  
 
Based on these factors, it held that the City of Marion had 
“shown a governmental interest sufficient to justify submitting 
Krieg to random, suspicionless drug testing.”56 
Though engaging in a balancing test once it had identified a 
special governmental need was consistent with the requirement of Von 
Raab (mentioned above),57 the court here relied on Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton and on the Seventh Circuit case of Joy v. Penn-
Harris-Madison School Corp. to explain the test.58 Each of these two 
                                                 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)). 
55 Id. (citing Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th 
Cir. 2000)). 
56 Id. at 519. 
57 See id. at 517. 
58 Id. at 518 (citing Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; Joy, 212 F.3d at 1059). 
11
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cases dealt with randomly testing schoolchildren for drug use. As 
explained in Part III below, randomly drug testing schoolchildren 
implicates a different body of Supreme Court precedent than does 
randomly drug testing adults.59 Setting forth the balancing test under 
these two school cases, the court simply asserted that it should 
consider the factors above. It did not mention—even though it had 
recognized as much when it set forth the special needs test under Von 
Raab, one page earlier—that the purpose of its balancing test should 
have been to determine whether it was impractical to require “some 
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context.”60 
The court’s treatment of each factor further demonstrates it did 
not conduct this balancing test with the purpose of determining 
whether the City was justified in departing from the general rule 
requiring individual suspicion. The court held that the nature of 
Krieg’s privacy interest was diminished because he had submitted to 
drug testing on a previous occasion.61 It then rejected Krieg’s claim 
that the character of the intrusion was “severe” because the City did 
not follow its own testing policy.62 This claim centered on whether 
choosing a random date on which to test an entire Department was 
truly “random, suspicionless drug testing.”63 The Seventh Circuit 
concluded that the City had complied with its own policy.64 Clearly, 
neither of these arguments or conclusions relate to whether testing 
Department employees only when the City had reason to suspect they 
had used drugs would be impractical. Instead, the court’s consideration 
of these two factors related only to the degree of intrusion on Krieg’s 
privacy interests.65 
                                                 
59 See infra Part III. 
60 Compare Krieg, 481 F.3d at 517 with id. at 518. 
61 Id. at 518-19. As mentioned earlier, the prior program was aimed at CDL 
holders. Krieg does not have a CDL, and the City conceded that it was improper to 
test him under that program. Id. at 515. 
62 Id. at 519. 
63 See id. 
64 Id. 
65 It was not improper for the court to consider only the intrusion on individual 
privacy when it evaluated these first two factors. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor 
12
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The court next addressed the nature and immediacy of the City’s 
need for the drug testing program. “[T]he City [had] a compelling 
interest in ensuring that its employees who regularly drive large 
equipment around the City are not impaired by drugs or alcohol.”66 
With regard to the immediacy of the need, the court claimed that it 
was irrelevant that the City had not shown a “history of drug-related 
accidents by non-CDL holders” (such as Krieg) because the Supreme 
Court “has not required” such a showing.67 Even if it is true that the 
Supreme Court has not so required, the purpose of balancing these 
factors should have been to determine whether it would be impractical 
to impose a similar requirement.68 The Seventh Circuit did not address 
any practical concerns in its treatment of this factor. 
With regard to the final factor—the efficacy of the means chosen 
by the City to address its legitimate governmental concern—the court 
rejected Krieg’s claim that the City must “demonstrate that it could not 
address the problem by observing Department employees for 
                                                                                                                   
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 624-28 (1989) (analyzing the intrusion on railroad 
employees’ privacy and contrasting these “limited threats” with “the Government 
interest in testing without a showing of individualized suspicion”). However, at 
some point during this balancing test, the court should have considered the 
practicality of a suspicion-based testing program. The court’s failure in this regard is 
demonstrated below. 
66 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519. 
67 Id. The court cites to Board of Education of Independent School District No. 
92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 835 (2002) for the claim that the Supreme Court does not 
require a showing of a “particularized or pervasive drug problem” in order to justify 
suspicionless drug testing. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519. But Earls is also a case about 
testing schoolchildren for drug use, not about testing adults. Nevertheless, the Von 
Raab Court did allow the Customs Service to employ a program of suspicionless 
drug testing even though the Service had not shown a pervasive drug problem 
among its (adult) employees. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656, 673-74 (1989). See more on this issue infra Part III. 
68 While the practicality question under Von Raab is whether the City could 
have formed some level of individualized suspicion, suspicion based on a history of 
drug use among the group targeted for random testing would at least have been 
closer to such a threshold. Instead, the court here upholds a program of testing 
persons whom the City has absolutely no reason to suspect of drug use—either 
individually or as a group. 
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suspicious behavior.”69 This is the only time in its balancing test that 
the court mentioned the practicality of requiring some level of 
suspicion. The court’s response, however, was that “neither the 
Supreme Court nor this Court has ever held that this showing is a 
requirement of imposing random drug tests.”70 It may be true that 
neither court has ever required this specific showing. However (as will 
be shown in Part III below), the Supreme Court has required some 
reason that developing individual suspicion would be impractical.71 If 
the Seventh Circuit did ascertain such a reason in this case, it did not 
share that reason with its readers. 
Thus, in this brief opinion, the Seventh Circuit adopted a bright 
line rule that safety concerns alone are sufficient to justify random, 
suspicionless drug testing. Further, it showed that the court will 
eschew any attempt to require a governmental body to demonstrate 
that the normal requirements of the Fourth Amendment would 
undermine that body’s attempt to address such safety concerns. 
 
III. THE SUPREME COURT USES A FACT-SPECIFIC APPROACH FOR THE 
PUBLIC WORKPLACE 
 
The Supreme Court has upheld suspicionless workplace drug 
testing by government agents in two cases: Skinner72 and Von Raab.73 
Each of these cases involved a policy that required workplace drug 
testing triggered by a certain event—a train accident and an 
application for promotion, respectively—rather than by individualized 
suspicion. Each case placed substantial emphasis on both the safety 
concerns raised by the job at issue and the way in which the relevant 
policy limited the discretion of the government agents.74 In addition, 
each case emphasized that the circumstances giving rise to a need for 
                                                 
69 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 519. 
70 Id. (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674). 
71 See infra Part III. 
72 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
73 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
74 See infra Parts III(A) and III(B). 
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drug testing justified a departure from the normal requirement of 
reasonable suspicion.75 
By contrast, the Supreme Court struck down a suspicionless drug 
testing scheme in Chandler v. Miller,76 where the scheme was meant 
to deter drug use among political candidates. The proponents of the 
testing program argued that it addressed safety concerns similar to 
those that justified the program in Von Raab.77 In addition, the 
program was statutory, and the statute defined the persons affected, the 
timing of the tests, and the process of information collection.78 
Therefore, government agents would have had limited discretion in the 
administration of the program. Nonetheless, the concerns the program 
addressed did not arise in circumstances unusual enough to justify a 
departure from the need for individualized suspicion.79 
When drug testing programs target schoolchildren, however, the 
Supreme Court has not required school officials to identify an unusual 
circumstance that would make drug testing based upon individualized 
suspicion impractical.80 Instead, it has adopted a bright line rule—
justified by and specific to the school setting—that eliminates the 
presumption in favor of individualized suspicion.81 Therefore, when 
evaluating drug testing programs in schools, the Supreme Court will 
balance the interests of the individual and the government on an even 
scale, rather than on a scale weighted in favor of the individual.  
Thus, the Supreme Court has created differing rules with regard to 
suspicionless drug testing for various contexts. In the context of 
schools, the overriding safety concern of preventing childhood drug 
use will be sufficient on its own to justify suspicionless testing, and 
                                                 
75 See infra Parts III(A) and III(B). 
76 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
77 See infra Part III(C). 
78 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309-10. 
79 See infra Part III(C). 
80 See infra Part III(D) for a discussion of the rules applicable to school 
settings. 
81 This is not to say that all suspicionless drug testing programs in schools will 
be constitutionally permissible. A court might still consider a testing program’s 
suspicionless nature when deciding whether it is reasonable. See infra Part III(D). 
15
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the Court will only ask whether the particular program at issue was 
reasonable. In the workplace, safety concerns have been sufficient to 
justify suspicionless testing only where they arise in circumstances 
that make individualized suspicion impractical. Because the testing 
program in Krieg affected adults (as opposed to schoolchildren), the 
Seventh Circuit should have followed the context-specific approach 
used by the Supreme Court in Skinner, Von Raab, and Chandler. 
 
A. Safety, Regulation, and an Unusual Need in Skinner 
 
In Skinner, a private railroad company was subject to regulations 
promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration (F.R.A.),82 and 
these regulations required the company to provide the F.R.A. with 
urine samples from all employees of the railroad who were directly 
involved in any major train accident.83 In addition, the F.R.A. 
regulations allowed railroad companies to test employees in particular 
positions when certain rule violations occurred, such as 
“noncompliance with a signal and excessive speeding.”84 A F.R.A. 
laboratory would test these samples for drugs and for alcohol 
content.85 To ensure that all employees were tested in the aftermath of 
major accidents, the railroad company had to transport them directly to 
a testing facility.86  
The Skinner Court addressed a constitutional challenge to this 
testing scheme by first determining whether the Fourth Amendment 
applied to the railroad company’s acts87 and whether collection of 
                                                 
82 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 614-15 (1989). 
83 Id. at 609. The regulations also required blood samples. The Court analyzed 
these separately throughout its opinion, so this article will focus only on the urine 
sampling. 
84 Id. at 611. 
85 Id. at 610 (regarding samples taken post-accident). Samples taken after a 
rule violation would be processed at an independent facility. Id. at 611. 
86 Id. at 609. 
87 Id. at 614-15. In these circumstances, the railroad company was a 
government agent with regard to the post-accident testing. And, with regard to the 
post-rule violation testing, the government was sufficiently involved in the railroad 
16
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urine for testing was a search,88answering both in the affirmative. 
Next, it evaluated whether the search could be reasonable in the 
absence of the default threshold: a warrant and probable cause.89 It 
determined that, in the circumstances presented, such searches could 
be reasonable because (a) the purpose of the testing went “beyond 
normal law enforcement,” creating a “special need;”90 and (b) the 
purposes of the warrant requirement were satisfied by the regulations 
themselves.91 
The purpose of the drug testing at issue was “to prevent accidents 
and casualties in railroad operations,” thus protecting the safety of “the 
traveling public and of the employees.”92 As evidence of this purpose, 
the Court looked in part to the categories of employees covered by the 
regulations.93 These employees included persons “handling orders 
concerning train movements, operating crews, and those engaged in 
the maintenance and repair of signal systems.”94 Both parties conceded 
that these positions required “safety-sensitive tasks.”95 
The Court did not assume that the “special need” created by this 
safety purpose and by the safety-sensitive nature of the employees’ 
tasks would automatically allow government agents to search 
employees without a warrant. Instead, it examined the purposes of the 
warrant requirement to decide whether that requirement should apply 
in the particular circumstances before it. It defined these purposes as: 
                                                                                                                   
company’s acts where it “removed all legal barriers to the testing,” had a “strong 
preference” that the company conduct such testing, and “share[d] the fruits of such 
intrusions.” Id. at 615.  
88 Id. at 617. The Court in Vernonia began in the same way, i.e., by 
determining that the Fourth Amendment protections reached public school officials 
and that compelled urinalysis constituted a search. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995). 
89 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619. 
90 Id. at 620 (citations omitted). 
91 Id. at 621-24. 
92 Id. at 620-21. 
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to assure citizens that searches are not “random or arbitrary acts of 
government agents;” to ensure that searches are narrow in both 
objective and scope; and to allow a neutral, objective magistrate to 
determine whether a search is justified in each particular case.96The 
F.R.A. regulations satisfied these purposes 97 because they specifically 
defined the narrow objectives and scope of the drug testing program, 
and because they were well-known to the employees affected.98 In 
addition, the regulations left “minimal discretion” to the persons who 
would administer the search.99 
Even though the Skinner Court had thus determined that the 
railroad company’s drug testing program served a special need and 
that the regulations mandating the program obviated the need for a 
warrant, it still had to decide whether the special need would justify a 
search without suspicion.100 It characterized the circumstances in 
which a search can be reasonable in the absence of any individualized 
suspicion as limited to those where (a) the intrusion on the individual’s 
privacy interests is minimal, (b) the government’s interests are 
important, and (c) requiring suspicion would undermine the 
government’s objective.101  
The Court found that the intrusion on the railway workers’ privacy 
was minimal because the collection environment was similar to a 
routine medical examination, and because the regulations limited the 
private facts revealed to those related to alcohol or drug use.102 The 
                                                 
96 Id. at 621-22. 
97 Id. at 624. 
98 Id. at 622. The Court also looked to the way that requiring a warrant would 
frustrate the objectives of the government in conducting the search. Here, the 
objective was to help determine whether drugs were a factor in a major train 
accident. Waiting for a warrant could allow evidence of these substances to 
metabolize out of the bodily fluids of the involved employees. Id. at 623. 
99 Id. at 622. 
100 Id. at 624. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 626-27. The testing procedures would also include information about 
any other medications that the employees were taking. The Court assumed in its 
18
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Court emphasized that the workers knew that their industry involved 
many regulations to ensure safety and that these regulations frequently 
dealt with employee health and fitness.103 Further, it emphasized that 
many companies in the railway industry required routine physical 
examinations, such as eye exams, for some groups of employees.104 
Thus, the workers had a diminished expectation of privacy.105 
The government’s interest in safety was important because of the 
danger presented by even a “momentary lapse of attention” by a 
person in the covered employees’ position.106 Therefore, the Court 
would not impose a requirement of reasonable suspicion if it would 
“seriously impede” the government’s objective. The Court gave three 
reasons that a requirement of reasonable suspicion would impede the 
government’s objective in these circumstances. First, an “impaired 
employee” would not show signs of impairment that an ordinary 
person could detect.107 Second, an investigator at the “chaotic” scene 
of a train accident would have difficulty determining who was 
responsible for the accident.108 Third, likewise, the time required to 
determine which of the individuals responsible for a rule violation 
might have been under the influence of drugs or alcohol would create 
a risk that the evidence available through urinalysis would metabolize 
and be lost.109 Thus, because of the particular difficulties of the 
circumstances giving rise to the need for drug testing, it would be 
“unrealistic” to require the railroad company to develop individualized 
suspicion of drug use prior to administering the tests.110 
                                                                                                                   
analysis that this information would be used only to prevent false positives and 
would be kept confidential. Id. at 626 n.7. 
103 Id. at 627-28. 
104 Id. at 627 & n.8. 
105 Id. at 627. 
106 Id. at 628. 
107 Id. at 628-29. 
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Only after it had thus considered whether the asserted special 
need of railroad safety would justify a departure from the requirement 
of individualized suspicion did the Skinner Court go on to determine 
whether the particular scheme of suspicionless tests required by the 
regulations was reasonable. For this inquiry, it looked to the efficacy 
of the means chosen by the F.R.A.111 Because the F.R.A. had 
“expressly considered various alternatives” and “reasonably found 
them wanting,”112 the Court held that it would not independently 
determine whether less intrusive means for obtaining evidence of drug 
or alcohol use were available.113 Therefore, the drug testing required 
by the F.R.A. regulations was reasonable.114 
 
B. Safety, Uniform Policy, and an Unusual Need in Von Raab 
 
The Court in Von Raab undertook a similar analysis when it 
addressed a challenge by the National Treasury Employees Union to 
the Customs Service’s policy of requiring a drug test from all 
applicants for promotion to positions that required carrying firearms or 
involved enforcing laws regarding illegal drugs.115  
It began by determining whether a warrant was required. It stated 
that, because the purpose of the program was to “deter drug use among 
those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions,” the program 
served a special governmental need.116 Once it found this special need, 
it was “necessary” to “balance the individual’s privacy expectations 
against the Government’s interest to determine whether it [was] 
                                                 
111 Id. at 631-32. 
112 Id. at 629 n.9. 
113 The court below asserted that the tests themselves were unreliable, but the 
Skinner Court held that the drug test need not provide conclusive proof of drug use 
in order to be reasonable. Id. at 631-32. 
114 Id. at 633-34. 
115 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). Also 
at issue was the testing of employees who would handle classified materials. Id. at 
661. The Court did not resolve the issue as to this group. Id. at 677-78. 
116 Id. at 666. 
20
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impractical to require a warrant or some level of individualized 
suspicion in the particular context.”117  
Thus, the Von Raab Court did not discuss the purposes of the 
warrant requirement in such depth as did the Skinner Court, but 
instead assumed that “some level of individualized suspicion” could 
be sufficient to meet the mandate of the Fourth Amendment.118The 
Von Raab Court concluded that requiring a warrant would be 
impractical because it would divert resources without creating any 
additional protection for the applicants. The interests protected by the 
warrant requirement were already satisfied because the testing policy 
was well-known to the applicants and left no room for discretion as to 
who would be tested.119  
The Von Raab Court also did not use Skinner’s language regarding 
the circumstances in which testing without suspicion could be 
permissible. However, it set forth a similar principle: suspicionless 
tests are constitutional in “certain limited circumstances” where there 
is a “compelling” governmental need that will “justify the intrusion on 
privacy.”120 In the Von Raab formulation, such compelling needs exist 
when the government must “discover . . . latent or hidden conditions” 
or “prevent their development.”121 This portion of the Von Raab 
standard addresses concerns similar to those in the Skinner test 
above122 because, clearly, requiring individualized suspicion of 
                                                 
117 Id. at 665-66. 
118 See id. 
119 Id. at 666-67. 
120 Id. at 668. The full standard is: “[I]n certain limited circumstances, the 
Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their 
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed 
by conducting such searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.” Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Supra Part III(A). Suspicionless searches can be reasonable if (a) the 
intrusion on the individual’s privacy interests is minimal, (b) the government’s 
interests are important, and (c) requiring suspicion would undermine the 
government’s objective. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
624 (1989). 
21
Lobelle: <em>Krieg v. Seybold</em>: The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Bright Li
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 388
wrongdoing would frustrate the objective of discovering hidden crimes 
or preventing criminal patterns that had not yet developed.  
The Von Raab Court thus upheld the Custom Service’s 
suspicionless drug testing policy123 where (1) the applicants expected 
inquiry into their fitness with regard to judgment and dexterity;124 (2) 
the safety and national security risks of promoting drug users to 
positions involving firearms and controlled substance enforcement 
were “extraordinary;”125 (3) the nature of the job did not permit day-
to-day supervision that would allow authorities to detect 
impairment;126 and (4) the government had a “compelling interest” in 
preventing even off-duty drug use by its applicants.127 
The Von Raab Court recited each of these circumstances as part of 
a larger inquiry into whether the interests of the government would 
outweigh those of the individual applicants.128 Therefore, the Von 
Raab decision might not require that lower courts consider each of the 
factors implicated by these circumstances: the expectations of the 
applicants, the magnitude of the safety concerns at issue, the degree of 
legitimate government interest, and the practicality of suspicion-based 
testing in the specific work environment at issue.129 However, at least 
this much is clear: the Von Raab Court did not hold that safety 
concerns on their own would suffice to justify suspicionless testing, 






                                                 
123 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677. 
124 Id. at 672. 
125 Id. at 674. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 See id. at 677. 
129 See id. at 667-677.  
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 389
C. The Chandler Court Rejects a Testing Program Where 
Circumstances Were Not Unusual Enough  
 
In the case of Chandler v. Miller,130 the Supreme Court struck 
down a Georgia statute that required that candidates for certain state 
offices pass a drug test within thirty days prior to nomination or 
election.131 The Eleventh Circuit had upheld the statute by relying 
upon the logic in Skinner and Von Raab: the statute served a special 
governmental need.132 The court looked to the state’s interest in 
ensuring that its officials could be trusted with the “ultimate 
responsibility for law enforcement” and the supervision of “drug 
interdiction efforts.”133 These were similar to the interests relied upon 
in Von Raab: ensuring that drug interdiction personnel “are physically 
fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judgment.”134 The Eleventh 
Circuit held that the state’s interests outweighed those of the 
candidates.135 
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the general rule, 
consistent with Skinner and Von Raab, that government officials 
normally must have individualized suspicion with regard to the subject 
of a search before the search can be reasonable within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.136 The Court went on to explain that 
“particularized exceptions” to this rule are “sometimes” permissible 
when based upon a special governmental need.137 “When such ‘special 
needs’ . . . are alleged,” the Court explained, “courts must undertake a 
                                                 
130 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
131 Id. at 308-10. 
132 Id. at 311-12. 
133 Id. 
134 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670. 
135 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 312. 
136 See id. at 308, 313. 
137 Id. at 313; see id. at 308 (citing to Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, and referring 
to border checkpoints, sobriety checkpoints, and administrative inspections of 
“closely regulated” businesses as examples of “certain limited circumstances” in 
which a search may be reasonable in the absence of individual suspicion). 
23
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context-specific inquiry, examining closely the competing private and 
public interests advanced by the parties.”138  
This explanation of the legal framework behind the Skinner and 
Von Raab safety exception makes explicit that the inquiry is “context-
specific” rather than a bright line. Though the context in Chandler 
differed from that in Skinner, Von Raab, and Krieg (because the 
persons to be tested were candidates for office rather than large groups 
of public employees), the underlying analysis was uniform. In none of 
these situations was the special governmental need in itself sufficient 
to justify suspicionless testing. Courts must use a fact-specific 
approach to determine whether some unusual circumstance will justify 
a departure from the general rule. The Chandler Court used the 
Skinner formulation to explain what circumstances provide such a 
justification, namely, “where the privacy interests implicated by the 
search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest 
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a 
requirement of individualized suspicion.”139 
The Georgia statute did not address an important governmental 
interest. Because concerns about candidates’ trustworthiness were 
“hypothetical”—there was not an existing drug problem among this 
group—the asserted special need was not “substantial” enough to 
justify intruding upon recognized privacy interests in the absence of 
individualized suspicion.140 The Court emphasized that while it is not 
true that in all cases there must be a demonstrated drug problem before 
a government agency can adopt a suspicionless drug testing program, 
the existence of a drug problem can help to justify such a program.141  
In addition, Georgia had not shown that requiring normal, 
suspicion-based searches would jeopardize the government’s ability to 
                                                 
138 Id. at 314 (citing Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 668). 
139 Id. (quoting Skinner v. Railway. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
624 (1989)). 
140 Id. at 318-19 (“Notably lacking in respondents’ presentation is any 
indication of a concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s 
main rule.”). 
141 Id. at 319. 
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meet its goal of deterring drug use among public officials.142 This was 
true because the candidates worked in the public eye—in sharp 
contrast to Von Raab, where the targeted group worked in a situation 
in which “day-to-day scrutiny” was impossible.143 When comparing 
Chandler to Von Raab, the Court further emphasized that Von Raab 
did not “open[] broad vistas for suspicionless searches.”144  
In sum, the Chandler Court confirmed that Skinner and Von Raab 
did not create a broad rule that special safety needs will always justify 
suspicionless searches. In other words, the Supreme Court has not 
created a bright line rule allowing suspicionless drug testing programs 
whenever such programs serve a special governmental need. 
Moreover, the Court established several facts relevant to the 
“context-specific” inquiry that each court must undertake before 
upholding a suspicionless testing program premised on a special need. 
First, situations allegedly creating safety concerns will not justify 
suspicionless searches where the concerns are merely hypothetical. 
Second, the existence of a drug problem is relevant to whether there is 
an important governmental interest at stake. And finally, the absence 
of a suspicion-based approach sufficient to address the relevant safety 
concerns is key to the inquiry of whether a suspicionless program can 
be justified. 
 
D. In Schools, No Unusual Circumstance is Necessary 
 
In contrast to the above cases regarding testing adults for drug 
use, the Supreme Court has created two bright line rules regarding 
drug testing in schools.  First, schools present special governmental 
needs. Second, the particular role of school officials as guardians over 
schoolchildren justifies suspicionless drug testing programs that target 
students in voluntary extracurricular activities. Therefore, the cases of 
Vernonia145 and Board of Education of Independent School District 
                                                 
142 Id. at 320. 
143 Id. at 321. 
144 Id. 
145 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
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No. 92 v. Earls,146 dealing with suspicionless drug testing in schools, 
are inappropriate sources of authority for a court to rely upon when 
determining whether suspicionless drug testing in a workplace is 
constitutionally permissible. 
In Vernonia, the Court recognized the first of these bright line 
rules—that schools present special governmental needs. In Vernonia, 
student athletes challenged a policy that required them to undergo 
random drug testing.147 The school administration thought athletes 
were “the leaders of the drug culture” and had therefore adopted the 
policy in response to a “sharp increase” in drug use in the school 
district.148  
The Court started with the general rule that, when law 
enforcement officials try to obtain “evidence of criminal wrongdoing,” 
a search will not be reasonable without a warrant supported by 
probable cause.149 It then set forth the principle that “when special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant 
and probable-cause requirement impracticable” a search can be 
reasonable even though it is not supported by probable cause.150 Next, 
the Court cited New Jersey v. T.L.O. for the proposition that special 
needs “exist in the public school context” because (a) the “warrant 
requirement would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift 
and informal disciplinary procedures [that are] needed;” and (b) the 
requirement of probable cause “would undercut the substantial need of 
teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the 
schools.”151 The Court did not make reference to any need for a 
context-specific inquiry to determine whether the Vernonia schools 
                                                 
146 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
147 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 648-49. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 652-53. 
150 Id. at 653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)). 
151 Id. (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-41 (1985)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
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presented special governmental needs.152 Rather, it treated this 
language from T.L.O. as a bright line rule. 
This bright line rule did not establish that random drug testing was 
permissible in schools, because T.L.O. dealt with a search based on 
individualized suspicion.153 Thus, the next inquiry of the Vernonia 
Court was whether this special need would allow school officials to 
conduct suspicionless searches. To answer this question, the Court 
considered the nature of the privacy interest, the character of the 
intrusion, the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, and 
the efficacy of the means used to address the concern.154 
In holding that a suspicionless search was justified, the Court 
emphasized that, because the testing program affected schoolchildren, 
the “most significant element” in its decision was that the school had 
“responsibilities . . . as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its 
care.”155 Further, the Court “caution[ed] against the assumption that 
suspicionless drug testing [would] readily pass constitutional muster in 
other contexts.”156 In this cautionary paragraph, it contrasted the 
context of a school, where one must ask whether the officials acted as 
reasonable guardians, with the context of employment, where one 
must ask whether the officials acted as reasonable employers.157 
                                                 
152 See id. at 653-54. 
153 Id. at 653; T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 344-46. 
154 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-64. Although the Vernonia Court cited to 
Skinner for the proposition that some suspicionless searches are acceptable, it did not 
explicitly employ the test for whether a search can be reasonable in the absence of 
suspicion that Skinner set forth (supra Part III(A)). See id. at 653-54. However, in 
the course of its balancing test (which used factors articulated in similar language to 
those used by the Krieg court), it explicitly addressed whether testing based on 
suspicion would be practicable in public schools. See id. at 663-64. Though it used 
the language of “efficacy,” it also addressed the inquiry of whether requiring 
suspicion would frustrate the objective of the administrators. Id. In this discussion, it 
pointed to parent resistance to suspicion-based testing, to possible unfair effects on 
troubled children, and to the burden that would be posed on schoolteachers where 
they are not trained in the duty of recognizing signs of drug use. Id. 
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The next case addressing suspicionless drug testing in schools was 
Earls.158 In that case, students in extracurricular activities again 
challenged a random drug testing policy. The Earls Court started with 
the bright line rule recognized in Vernonia: that “‘special needs’ inhere 
in the public school context” such that probable cause may not be 
necessary to justify a search.159 However, unlike the Court in 
Vernonia, the Earls Court did not conduct a separate inquiry into 
whether suspicionless searches could be reasonable. Instead, based on 
the Vernonia proposition that in public schools “the ‘reasonableness’ 
inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary 
responsibility for children,”160 the Court asserted that “a finding of 
individualized suspicion may not be necessary when a school conducts 
drug testing.”161 
The Court clarified the meaning of this assertion later in its 
opinion, when it rejected the students’ claim that drug testing 
presumptively requires individualized suspicion by saying, “[i]n this 
context, the Fourth Amendment does not require a finding of 
individualized suspicion.”162 To support this response, the Court 
referred the reader back to the section of its opinion regarding the 
special needs inherent in schools.163 
Thus, in sharp contrast to the cases of Skinner, Von Raab, and 
Chandler, the Earls Court did not undertake a context-specific 
balancing test to determine whether a departure from the normal 
requirement of individualized suspicion could be justified by some 
unusual circumstance. Instead, the Earls Court created a bright line 
rule that individualized suspicion is not presumptively necessary in the 
context of school drug tests, even though it is presumptively necessary 
for other drug tests.164 Thus, the school context will—in effect—
                                                 
158 Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
159 Id. at 829 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653). 
160 Id. at 830 (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656). 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 837. 
163 Id. 
164 See supra Parts III(A)-III(C). 
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replace a balancing test that is weighted in favor of individual privacy 
with one that is measured on an even scale.165 
 
E. Summary of Supreme Court Treatment of Suspicionless Drug Tests 
 
Skinner and Von Raab make clear that the fact that government 
agents have a safety purpose for their drug testing program will not 
obviate the need to determine whether those agents were justified in 
departing from the requirement of individualized suspicion. Instead, 
the Supreme Court will look to the circumstances surrounding the 
safety concern for some reason that it would be impractical to require 
individual suspicion.166 
Further, the Chandler case has shown that not all safety concerns 
are important enough to present a special governmental need. Instead, 
the concerns that the testing program addresses must be real and 
substantial. Finally, the Chandler Court explained that when it looks 
for an unusual circumstance that will justify a suspicionless test, it will 
consider whether there was a drug problem among the targeted group 
of persons.167 
By contrast, in the school context, the Supreme Court has 
eliminated any presumption that individualized suspicion is required 
before a drug testing program involving school children can be 
reasonable. Instead, it allows courts to balance the interests of the 
individual students against those of the school officials and to assess 
the efficacy of those officials’ chosen method of drug deterrence 
without any initial inquiry into whether the school’s needs could be 
served by a suspicion-based program.168 
                                                 
165 This bright line rule does not mean that all drug testing in schools will be 
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830. 
However, it does allow courts to look directly to whether a reasonable guardian 
would have acted as the school district did without first asking whether some 
unusual circumstance justified the school district in disregarding general rule 
requiring individualized suspicion. 
166 Supra Parts III(A) and III(B). 
167 Supra Part III(C). 
168 Supra Part III(D). 
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IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S BRIGHT LINE RULE CREATES SIGNIFICANT 
POLICY CONCERNS 
 
As shown above in Part II, the Krieg court treated the fact that the 
City of Marion had a safety purpose for its drug testing program as 
sufficient to eliminate any presumption that individualized suspicion 
was required. Thus, it analyzed Krieg’s case in a manner more 
appropriate to a school context than to a workplace. This was 
inappropriate because, as shown above, the cases addressing drug 
testing in schools have been premised almost entirely on the role of 
school administrators as the guardians of the minor children for whom 
they are responsible.169 
Had it used the Skinner framework for evaluating workplace drug 
testing by government agents, the Krieg court would have first 
determined whether (a) the intrusion on Krieg’s privacy interest was 
minimal, (b) the City’s interests were important, and (c) requiring 
suspicion would have undermined the City’s objective.170 Only after 
determining that this threshold was met would it have been possible 
for the court to hold that the City’s suspicionless drug testing program 
was reasonable. Instead, the Krieg court balanced the interests of 
Krieg and the City on even scale, ignoring the presumption that when 
the City chose a random drug testing program it chose an unreasonable 
method of pursuing its interests.171  
By omitting the analytical step of determining whether the special 
need asserted by the government created some unusual circumstance 
that would make the normal application of the Fourth Amendment 
(requiring individualized suspicion at an absolute minimum) 
impractical, the Seventh Circuit “un-tipped” a balance that normally 
weighs in favor of individual privacy rights. This creates significant 
policy concerns. First, it stretches a narrow exception to 
                                                 
169 See supra Part III(D). 
170 Supra Part III(A); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 
602, 624 (1989). 
171 See supra Part II for the reasoning used by the Krieg court. 
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constitutionally-required protections to include a large number of blue-
collar workers, without explaining why it was appropriate to do so. 
Second, even if it were appropriate, the decision is not desirable in that 
it undermines the goals of the Fourth Amendment. It does so by 
diminishing the incentive for public employers to obtain public input 
and to consider less intrusive means before implementing drug testing 
programs that will affect large numbers of people.  
 
A. The Seventh Circuit Expanded the Exception to the Supreme Court’s 
Rule 
 
As will be shown, the Seventh Circuit broadly interpreted the 
safety concerns that will satisfy Skinner. This is not necessarily 
incorrect. However, when paired with the bright line effect that the 
Seventh Circuit has given to the Skinner test, the result is an exception 
permitting suspicionless drug testing that threatens to swallow the rule.  
In short, the Seventh Circuit has applied the concept of safety-
sensitive positions in a way that will include much of the blue-collar 
public workforce. The Seventh Circuit has also interpreted Skinner, 
Von Raab, Vernonia, and Earls to mean that, where a worker holds a 
safety-sensitive position, a public employer can test that worker for 
drug use without any need for individualized suspicion.172 Thus, the 
general rule that an employer must have individualized suspicion to 
test an employee for drug use will apply to far fewer people than it 
would have if the court had applied the Skinner rule differently in the 
Krieg decision.  
Because of the widespread effect of its interpretation of Skinner, 
and because this interpretation was not compelled by precedent, the 
Krieg court should have explained why it was appropriate to adopt a 




                                                 
172 Supra Part II. 
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation of Skinner Was Not Compelled 
by Precedent 
 
Consistent with Skinner, the Krieg court defined safety-sensitive 
positions as those “fraught with such risks of injury to others that even 
a momentary lapse of attention [could] have disastrous 
consequences.”173 Using primarily district court cases from other 
circuits, the court concluded that Krieg’s position was similar enough 
to the other safety-sensitive positions for which random drug testing 
had been allowed that a “reasonable jury would conclude” that Krieg 
was a safety-sensitive employee.174  
The Seventh Circuit cited first to appellate level cases from other 
circuits about random drug testing in the aviation, rail, highway, and 
water transportation industries, listing some of the employees covered 
in these industries’ testing regimes.175 However, it did not mention any 
similarities between the positions covered in those cases and Krieg’s 
position as the operator of several types of heavy equipment, such as a 
one-ton dump truck, a dump truck with a plow, a front end loader, and 
a backhoe.176 The court then looked to two federal district court cases 
and to a Michigan Supreme Court case, each of which involved heavy 
equipment operators of some kind.177 Based on these cases, the 
Seventh Circuit claimed that “[a] number of courts” agree that heavy 
                                                 
173 Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Skinner, 489 
U.S. at 628) (bracketed material in original). 
174 Id. at 518.  
175 Bluestein v. Dep’t of Transp., 908 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1990); Am. Fed’n 
Gov’t Employees v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1989). These cases are 
immediately distinguishable from the situation in Krieg because, like Skinner, they 
involved testing regimes created by regulations or official orders that limited the 
scope and circumstances of each drug test. Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 453; Am. Fed’n 
Gov’t Employees, 885 F.2d at 886-88. 
176 See Krieg, 481 F.3d at 518. 
177 Id. (citing Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, 
C-89-4112-DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992); 
Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992); Middlebrooks v. 
Wayne County, 521 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1994)). 
32
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 399
equipment operators can create a threat to safety that is sufficient 
under Skinner.178  
The court next looked to federal district court cases in which 
public employees’ positions were not safety-sensitive.179Two of those 
cases held that workers such as mail van and shuttle bus drivers did 
not satisfy the Skinner test. Krieg’s job was safety-sensitive because 
Krieg operated equipment that was “larger and more difficult to 
operate” than the equipment in those cases.180 The fact that he did not 
operate this equipment in a rural area away from other vehicles and 
pedestrians added to the safety-sensitive nature of Krieg’s job.181 
The first case the Krieg court relied upon was American 
Federation of Government Employees v. Cheney, an unpublished case 
from the United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California.182 In Cheney, civilian employees of the Navy challenged 
the Navy’s Drug-Free Workplace Plan, which was created in 
compliance with President Reagan’s Executive Order requiring all 
federal agencies to create programs to eliminate drugs from their 
workplace.183 The Navy’s program included random testing for certain 
categories of employees.184 All employees were subject to testing in 
the aftermath of an accident and to testing based on individualized 
suspicion.185  
The Cheney court asserted that, in addition to balancing private 
interests against governmental interests in order to determine whether 
random drug testing was permissible, a court must also find that “there 
                                                 
178 Id. 
179 Id. (citing Burka v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 751 F. Supp. 441, 443-44 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Watkins, 722 F. Supp. 766, 
770 (D.D.C. 1989); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Lyng, 706 F. Supp. 934, 947 
(D.D.C. 1988)). 
180 Id. (referring to Watkins and Lyng).  
181 Id. 
182 Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-89-4112-
DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992). 
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is a clear, direct nexus between the nature of the employee’s duties and 
the compelling governmental interest articulated by the 
government.”186 Throughout its opinion, the court emphasized that 
jobs that were “no more dangerous” than “traditional blue-collar 
tasks” would not raise safety concerns of the “significant level” 
required to justify a suspicionless search.187 
On a motion for summary judgment, the court held that the 
government had not shown that the duties of forklift operators, tractor 
operators, road sweeper operators, and engineering equipment 
operators had a sufficient nexus to its interest in safety.188 Instead, 
among those challenged, the only category of employees from the 
“Transportation Mobile Equipment Operators Family” of employees 
that did have the requisite nexus to safety was crane operators.189 
Unlike the other types of heavy equipment operators, crane operators 
lifted large loads above the ground, creating an opportunity for true 
disaster.190 By contrast, the other operators did not create exceptional 
safety concerns because they drove their vehicles at “slower speeds 
than automobiles” and normally did not drive on public roads.191Thus, 
the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to all 
of the mobile equipment operators except for the crane operators.192 
                                                 
186 Id. at *2. 
187 Id. at **11-12. Most pipefitters, riggers, and shipwrights performed tasks 
that were no more dangerous than ordinary blue-collar work. Id. The court 
emphasized elsewhere in its opinion that “[w]ork with machinery does not 
automatically carry with it the risk of unpredictable catastrophic accidents.” Id. at 
*12. In all, the court analyzed thirteen different “families” of positions within the 
Navy’s civilian workforce; these families were grouped by duties and were titled 
“plumbing family,” “metal work family,” “electrician work group,” and the like. The 
court held that eight of these families were not safety-sensitive or were defined in a 
manner that included too many non-safety-sensitive workers. Three families were 
safety-sensitive. The court parsed the remaining two families, holding that some 
positions within those families were safety-sensitive and others were not. 
188 Id. at *13. 
189 Id. at **13-14. 
190 Id. at *13. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. at *14. 
34
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 12
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/12
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 
 401
The next case Krieg relied upon was Plane v. United States, from 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Michigan.193 In that case, civilian employees of the Defense Logistics 
Agency sought summary judgment in their challenge of that agency’s 
Drug-Free Workplace Plan, which required certain groups of 
employees to undergo random drug testing.194 These employees 
included forklift operators, tractor operators, engineering operators, 
and crane operators.195 In holding that the duties of these employees 
presented a sufficient nexus to the government’s safety concern, the 
court emphasized that the jobs at issue involved using heavy 
equipment to lift and move thousands of pounds to heights ranging 
from fourteen to fifty feet, and that some of the positions involved 
operating cutting torches near “fuel cells and other hazardous 
devices.”196 The court then held that the dangers to safety that these 
jobs presented were sufficient to justify random drug testing.197 The 
court did not explain why the magnitude of these harms was 
“disastrous” within the meaning of Skinner; it only explained that the 
harms that could result were “immediate.”198 
Finally, the Krieg court drew support from Middlebrooks v. Wayne 
County, in the Supreme Court of Michigan,199 for its claim that heavy 
equipment operators can create safety risks that are sufficient under 
                                                 
193 Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992). 
194 Id. at 1070-71. 
195 Id. at 1075. 
196 Id. at 1075-76. Forklift operators might lift up to 10,000 pounds, tractor 
operators tow trailers through narrow passages and other difficult to navigate spaces 
and thus must make sure that all couplings are secure and that speed, clearance, and 
weight limitations are observed, crane operators lift up to 50 tons, engineering 
operators operate the cutting torches, and some of these jobs also involve operating a 
bulldozer. Id. 
197 Id. at 1077. Operators could drop their loads onto a fellow employee, 
hazardous materials could be released by a cutting torch accident, trailers towed by a 
tractor could tip over while navigating a narrow passage, equipment operators may 
back over someone while not looking, etc. Id. 
198 See id. (concluding that the harms were “immediate” and deciding, without 
reasoning, that they were “quite significant”). 
199 521 N.W.2d 774 (Mich. 1994). 
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Skinner to justify testing without individualized suspicion. The 
holding in Middlebrooks provides the strongest support for the 
conclusion that Krieg’s job was safety-sensitive, because the plaintiff 
in Middlebrooks operated several of the same kinds of machines that 
Krieg operated. There, the plaintiff was an applicant for a position 
with the Wayne County Road Commission that would require him to 
operate “a riding lawn mower on highway medians and 
embankments,” to drive “dump trucks carrying equipment” between 
road commission work sites and repair facilities, and to operate a front 
end loader.200 
The court emphasized that the safety risks involved in the job for 
which Mr. Middlebrooks applied were more significant than those 
inherent in the operation of motor vehicles by the general public, 
because he would be operating this heavy equipment on the medians 
and embankments of roads designed for cars, vans, and trucks 
traveling at high rates of speed.201 The court balanced these safety 
concerns against the diminished expectation of privacy that occurred 
when Mr. Middlebrooks applied for a job that he knew required drug 
testing—and when he, in fact, consented to the test.202 It then 
concluded that it was appropriate to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim that 
Wayne County violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it tested 
his urine for illegal drugs.203 
In Middlebrooks, the court recognized that federal courts have not 
uniformly agreed that heavy equipment operation creates a safety risk 
of sufficient magnitude to justify drug testing without individualized 
suspicion, under the Skinner standard.204 The Middlebrooks court 
lengthens its list of courts that have held in favor of testing heavy 
equipment operators by including cases regarding drivers of passenger 
                                                 
200 Id. at 775. 
201 Id. at 779-80. 
202 Id. at 778-80. 
203 Id. at 779. 
204 Id. at 778-79. 
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vehicles, but the authority that it cites directly is limited to two 
cases—one of which is the Plane case discussed above.205 
Therefore, the cases on which the Seventh Circuit relied to 
conclude that Krieg’s position was safety-sensitive within the meaning 
of Skinner reveal only the following: First, one district court has held 
that most heavy equipment operators fall outside the “safety-sensitive” 
designation, but that crane operators fall within that title because they 
lift heavy loads high in the air.206 Second, another district court held 
that several heavy equipment operators created safety risks that were 
“immediate” because they lifted heavy loads high in the air, moved 
heavy loads through difficult-to-manage passages, or operated cutting 
torches near explosive devices.207 Third, a state court held that 
operating certain kinds of heavy equipment—the same kinds that 
Krieg operated—on highway medians or on highways created a safety 
risk within the meaning of Skinner.208 And finally, lower federal courts 
overall have been divided about whether heavy equipment operation is 
a safety-sensitive task within the meaning of Skinner.209  
All together, these cases do not justify the Seventh Circuit in 
resting on a simple assertion that courts have “upheld drug testing of 
heavy equipment operators” and have limited the groups that can be 
drug tested by excluding persons who drive mail vans and shuttle 
busses.210 Thus, the Seventh Circuit’s decision to include Krieg within 
the class of safety-sensitive employees was neither required by 
precedent nor supported by uniform persuasive authority. The Seventh 
Circuit announced its agreement with a rule that heavy equipment 
operators are safety-sensitive employees within the meaning of 
Skinner without ever addressing the fact that persuasive authorities 
were divided about whether they should be. 
                                                 
205 Id. at 779 nn.25, 26. 
206 See Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-89-
4112-DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992). 
207 See Plane v. United States, 796 F. Supp. 1070 (W.D. Mich. 1992). 
208 See Middlebrooks, 521 N.W.2d 774. 
209 See id. 
210 Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2007). 
37
Lobelle: <em>Krieg v. Seybold</em>: The Seventh Circuit Adopts a Bright Li
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2007




2. The Seventh Circuit’s Broad Interpretation of Skinner Will Have 
Widespread Effect 
 
Because the Seventh Circuit employed a broader application of 
the Skinner concept of safety-sensitive employees than did some 
federal courts, it should have explained why it was adopting the 
broader view. Beyond the need for reasoned judicial opinions, this 
failure on the part of the court is particularly severe because the effect 
of this application was to create a bright line rule211 excepting a large 
number of public employees from a constitutionally-required 
protection. 
While not every blue-collar worker operates heavy machinery, the 
Seventh Circuit makes clear in Krieg that blue-collar workers other 
than heavy equipment operators have safety-sensitive positions as 
well. The court lists, as representatives of some of the other groups of 
safety-sensitive employees, workers in the aviation, rail, highway, and 
water transportation industries.212 Blue-collar workers account for 
approximately 245,000 of the federal government’s 1.75 million 
employees.213 That is about 14% of the federal workforce. Add to 
these all of the blue-collar workers employed by State and local 
governments, and the result is a sizable portion of the public 
workforce. 
While there are many instances in which members of the public 
will be subject to suspicionless searches of some kind—such as airport 
screenings and business inspections—each of these exceptions has 
                                                 
211 See supra Part II. 
212 Krieg, 481 F.3d at 518. 
213 Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees, AFGE At A Glance, http://www.afge.org/ 
Index.cfm?Page=AFGEFacts (last visited Dec. 6, 2007); Stephen Barr, Eagerly 
Anticipated Raises for Blue-Collar Workers Are a Tangle, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 
2004, at B02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A44771-
2004Mar9?language=printer. 
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been the result of significant discussion on the part of the courts.214 
Each has its own narrowly drawn limits and each expansion of such 
exception is in effect “tampering with the scales of justice” in an area 
of law in which a “citizen’s interest in freedom” is supposed to be 
given additional weight.215  
The Seventh Circuit incorrectly interpreted the limits of the 
exception for workplace drug testing by removing any weight on the 
side of a requirement of individualized suspicion.216 Theoretically 
problematic on its own, this mistake became disastrous when the court 
additionally held, without adequate explanation, that large numbers of 
ordinary blue-collar workers are subject to that exception. This failure 
is particularly troublesome because one of the three cases on which the 
Seventh Circuit relied makes clear that the safety exception should not 
be construed in a manner that will encompass ordinary blue-collar 
workers.217 
 
B. A Lost Incentive for Non-Governmental Input and for Less Intrusive 
Means 
 
Even if it was appropriate for the Seventh Circuit to expand the 
safety exception in this way, it is not at all clear that this expansion is 
desirable. This is because the policies underlying the Fourth 
Amendment favor the encouragement of methods whereby 
government agents seek input from the public or from the targets of 
searches before conducting those searches. 
For example, one purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect 
citizens against intrusions on their privacy where those intrusions are 
                                                 
214 See supra Part I for an introduction to these exceptions. See also Mich. 
Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1990) (safety-based checkpoint 
stops rely on different precedent than do safety-based workplace drug tests). 
215 See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 473 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
216 See supra Part II. 
217 Am. Fed’n Gov’t Employees v. Cheney, Nos. C-88-3823-DLJ, C-89-4112-
DLJ, C-89-4443-DLJ, 1992 WL 403388, **11-12 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1992). 
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not justified at the outset by some legitimate governmental interest.218 
This purpose is better served when unreasonable searches are 
prevented than when such searches are merely punished or stopped.219 
Input from the public or from the intended subjects of a search could 
help government bodies become aware of potential problems with 
their intended drug testing programs. For example, there might be 
reasons why a particular group should be excluded from testing220 or 
why a particular collection protocol is worrisome. Discovering these 
problems before the testing program is implemented could both 
decrease the need for litigation and promote the Fourth Amendment 
policy of preventing unnecessary intrusion. 
Public input also serves the purpose that underlies the warrant 
requirement: ensuring that a neutral body determines the scope of the 
justified intrusion by describing the persons, places, and things to be 
affected.221 If the government and the individuals to be affected 
discuss these terms before a testing program is implemented, then they 
can potentially reach an agreement about what kind of testing program 
is reasonable. This might include not only the time, place, and persons 
involved, but could also include a discussion of less intrusive 
alternatives to random testing. This agreement may not be “neutral,” 
but it will represent both interested parties rather than only one. 
Clearly, the Fourth Amendment does not require such input. However, 
input of this kind promotes the interests that underlie the law. 
                                                 
218 See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“No right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or 
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” (quoting 
Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891))). 
219 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (discussing the need for a 
“deterrent safeguard” to protect the Fourth Amendment), abrogated in part by 
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
220 See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 677-78 
(1989) (upholding a testing program with regard to one group of Customs Service 
employees but remanding for further information as to the need for testing all 
employees in a separate group). 
221 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989). 
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The City of Marion apparently believed that there was some 
benefit to receiving input from the workers of the Department of 
Streets and Sanitation about the City’s drug testing policy. The City 
had bargained with the union representing those employees and signed 
a collective bargaining agreement that allowed the City to test workers 
for drugs after accidents and upon reasonable suspicion.222 Further, the 
parties had negotiated a personnel handbook that allowed the City to 
test “safety-sensitive” employees—those who held a commercial 
driver’s license or operated commercial motor vehicles—on a random 
basis.223  
Nonetheless, the City unilaterally adopted a new handbook that 
re-defined “safety-sensitive” employees to include all employees with 
duties “related to the safe operation of City equipment.”224 The union 
and the employees represented by it refused to agree to these terms, 
but the City implemented them anyway.225 Krieg fell within this new 
category of safety-sensitive employees.226 Therefore, in essence, 
Krieg’s termination and subsequent lawsuit was the result of the City’s 
decision to back out of the deal that it had made with its employees 
about what kinds of searches were permissible. 
Does the Fourth Amendment provide redress for such bad 
behavior? Of course not. But when the City chose to bargain with the 
employees, it obtained their consent227 before conducting an intrusive 
                                                 
222 Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512, 514-15 (7th Cir. 2007). 
223 Id. at 515. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 515-16. 
227 Here, the author uses this term “consent” in its more colloquial sense. Krieg 
argued that because Indiana unions do not have the benefit of certain public 
employee collective bargaining laws available in other states, the union in this case 
could not have waived his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches even if it had agreed to random drug testing of non-CDL holders. 
Nonetheless, Krieg agreed that some unions do have the power to waive employees’ 
rights. See Reply Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants, Robert Krieg and American 
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 3063, 2006 WL 
3098735, at **14-17, Krieg v. Seybold, 481 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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search. When it unilaterally adopted a different policy with regard to 
such searches, the result was that employees felt—correctly or 
incorrectly—that the intrusion was unjustified.228  
By condoning the City’s behavior in the Krieg case, the Seventh 
Circuit has diminished the incentive for the City to bargain in the 
future. If the City can implement a random drug testing program 
without showing that it is the only workable way to address its safety 
concerns, then it will have little incentive to engage in the lengthy and 
costly process of bargaining with its employees about whether and to 
what extent such a program is necessary. Where before the City sought 
the union’s input into which employees should be subject to random 




The Seventh Circuit’s decision to consider Krieg a safety-
sensitive employee was not wrong. However, because the Seventh 
Circuit incorrectly asserted that safety-sensitive employees can be 
subject to suspicionless drug testing as long as the interests promoted 
by the testing program outweigh the employees’ privacy interests, the 
overall result of the court’s decision in Krieg was problematic. First, it 
misconstrues Supreme Court precedent in a way that confuses the 
context of a public workplace with that of a public school. This 
confusion created a bright line rule in an area where the Supreme 
Court has required a fact-sensitive inquiry. Second, the result of this 
confusion was that the court failed to inquire whether departure from 
the Fourth Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion was 
                                                 
228 This effect can be seen in Krieg’s reaction to the unannounced drug test that 
precipitated this lawsuit. Krieg first refused to submit to the test, and then 
immediately tried to call his union attorney. Krieg, 481 F.3d at 515-16. One can infer 
that Krieg did not believe that the City was permitted to test him in the manner it 
was asserting that it could. As a result, the City had to resort to threats to call police 
before Krieg would leave the premises. Id. If the City had resolved its differences 
with its employees through bargaining, then Krieg would have known that whatever 
options his boss presented to him were the same options that he would hear from his 
union representative. If nothing else, this would have the value of reassuring Krieg 
that he was not being unfairly singled-out or otherwise mistreated. 
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justified by the safety concerns that the City of Marion raised. Third, 
this failure undermines incentives for bargaining with public 
employees with regard to the conditions that will trigger drug testing. 
Such bargaining is desirable because it promotes the goals of the 
Fourth Amendment itself.  
Because when the court labeled Krieg a safety-sensitive employee 
it did not include a principled reason to distinguish him from other 
heavy equipment operators or from large numbers of other kinds of 
blue-collar workers, these problematic results will be far-reaching in 
effect, if the Seventh Circuit does not remedy its mistakes. 
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